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Abstract. Even when completely and consistently formulated, a fundamental theory
of physics and cosmological boundary conditions may not give unambiguous and
unique predictions for the universe we observe; indeed inflation, string/M theory, and
quantum cosmology all arguably suggest that we can observe only one member of
an ensemble with diverse properties. How, then, can such theories be tested? It
has been variously asserted that in a future measurement we should observe the a
priori most probable set of predicted properties (the “bottom-up” approach), or the
most probable set compatible with all current observations (the “top-down” approach),
or the most probable set consistent with the existence of observers (the “anthropic”
approach). These inhabit a spectrum of levels of conditionalization and can lead to
qualitatively different predictions. For example, in a context in which the densities
of various species of dark matter vary among members of an ensemble of otherwise
similar regions, from the top-down or anthropic viewpoints – but not the bottom-up
– it would be natural for us to observe multiple types of dark matter with similar
contributions to the observed dark matter density. In the anthropic approach it is
also possible in principle to strengthen this argument and the limit the number of
likely dark matter sub-components. In both cases the argument may be extendible
to dark energy or primordial density perturbations. This implies that the anthropic
approach to cosmology, introduced in part to explain “coincidences” between unrelated
constituents of our universe, predicts that more, as-yet-unobserved coincidences should
come to light.
PACS numbers: 98.80.Cq
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1. Introduction
Our surrounding physical universe is very well described by general relativity and
the (quantum mechanical) standard model of particle physics, combined with initial
conditions specifying a hot big-bang cosmology dominated by dark matter and dark
energy. But this description is fundamentally incomplete: explanations for dark matter
and dark energy lie outside of the standard model, general relativity is not a quantum
theory, and general relativity and the standard model cannot address the big-bang
singularity or initial conditions.
The current most highly regarded candidate theories of more fundamental physics
and of big-bang initial conditions appear to be, respectively, string/M theory and
inflation. Although it is not clear how (or whether) these theories may be combined into
some consistent quantum cosmology, it is interesting—and somewhat disquieting—that
string/M theory, inflation, and current formulations of quantum cosmology all share
an important feature: it is far from clear that any of the three components (even less
their potential combination) makes a single, unique set of predictions regarding our
observable world.
In current formulations of string/M theory, low-energy physics – such the
cosmological constant Λ, the particle physics coupling constants, and the cosmological
parameters – is governed by dynamical degrees of freedom called moduli that are in
turn governed by a low-energy effective potential which is itself determined by a set of
field fluxes. Metastable minima of this potential constitute vacua, one of which would
determine the physics of our world. There appears to be no unique vacuum (there is
a continuous space of different supersymmetric Λ = 0 vacua), nor any good reason to
suppose that there is just one (or even small number of) non-supersymmetric Λ > 0
vacua such as could describe our universe (see, e.g. [1, 2, 3, 4, 5] but also [6]).
In generic models for inflation, the observable universe is but one of many
thermalized regions spawned within an eternally inflating background [7, 8, 9]. Due
to the exponential expansion, each region may be described by a Friedmann cosmology
with some governing parameters, but fields governing these parameters (including the
M-theory moduli) may be globally inhomogeneous so that the parameters vary from
one region to another. Thus such inflation can lead to an ensemble of “sub-universes”
in which both particle physics coupling constants and cosmological parameters such as
the amplitude of primordial fluctuations [9], the cosmological constant [10, 11] or the
density of dark matter [12] may vary.
In formulations of quantum cosmology such as the “no boundary proposal” using
Euclidean quantum gravity, a prescription is given for computing the amplitude of a
given spatial section and field configuration. These are then pieced together to give
amplitudes for cosmological histories. In the “many worlds” interpretation of quantum
mechanics[13], all of these histories are equally real and co-exist in superposition.
Cosmological parameters such as the curvature scale [14, 15] or others [16] can then take
a random value in each world, drawn from a fairly well-defined probability distribution.
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If we are fortunate, these ways of understanding of quantum gravity, inflation, and
quantum cosmology will all turn out to be in some essential way incorrect or inapplicable
to a true “fundamental theory” of cosmology that will instead give unique predictions.
But if not, and at least in the meantime, we must face the rather thorny issue of how
to extract meaningful predictions from a theory that predicts a “multiverse”, by which
we mean an ensemble of physically-realized systems with different properties, only one
of which may possibly be observed by any given observer. This is the subject of the
present paper.
Three approaches to this problem have been widely adopted: the “bottom-up”,
“top-down”, and “anthropic” approaches. The meaning of these terms will become
clear in Sec 2. This paper argues for three basic points. First, that in a cosmological
context with no unique predictions, these different approaches are of more than academic
or philosophical interest: they correspond to different specific questions being implicitly
asked, and can lead to genuinely different answers to the more general question of
“what will we observe?” Second, that the top-down and bottom-up approaches should
be seen as two ends of a spectrum, with anthropic arguments in-between. Third, that
when applied to the specific subject of dark matter, what we expect to see in future
observations depends qualitatively on on which method of making predictions is adopted,
and that in the top-down or anthropic approaches a rather counter-intuitive general
prediction emerges.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In Sec. 2 we discuss the three basic ways of
making predictions, and how they may be viewed in a unified way. In Sec. 3 we make
generic predictions regarding dark matter in three different ways, in the context where
there are many possible types of dark matter with densities that vary from one member
to another of an ensemble of regions that otherwise resemble our observable universe.
The extension of the arguments to other cosmological quantities is discussed in Sec. 4,
and the general issue of “cosmic coincidences” is analyzed in Sec. 5. We draw general
conclusions in Sec. 6.
2. The spectrum of conditionalization
Imagine that we have a physical theory and set of cosmological boundary conditions (or
“wave function of the universe”), T , that predicts an ensemble of physically realized
systems, each of which is approximately homogeneous in some coordinates and can
be characterized by a set of parameters that may vary from one system to another.
Denote each such system a “universe” and the ensemble a “multiverse”. Given that we
can observe only one of these universes, what conclusions can we draw regarding the
correctness of T , and how? This is the problem apparently confronting – at varying
levels – eternal inflation, quantum cosmology in the many-worlds interpretation, and
string/M theory.
Because the alternative is to give up at the outset, let us assume that we have
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some quantitative way of comparing these universes† so that we may specify the joint
probability distribution P (α1, ..., αN) for observables αi (i = 1..N). To see what this
might involve, consider the combination of the string/M theory landscape with eternal
inflation. Let αi be low-energy particle physics or cosmological parameters that may be
compared to observations. To realize predictions of these αi we might use the following
successively definable quantities:
(i) The relative number Nvacua(αi,∆αi) of vacua with low-energy constants in the range
[αi, αi +∆αi] for each i.
(ii) The relative number Nreal of these vacua that actually come into being in
the cosmological context; this may differ exponentially from Nvacua because of
exponentially suppressed tunneling (or transition) rates between vacua.
(iii) The relative number NV of physical planck volumes on the post-inflation reheating
surface in all FRW cosmologies for which the range of low-energy constants holds.
This can easily differ exponentially from Nvacua due to different periods of inflation
(and may also involve ambiguous comparisons between infinite volumes[19, 20, 7,
21, 22].)
(iv) The relative number NB of baryons that exist in these volumes. These may be
quite different from NV depending on the physics of baryogenesis.
None of these quantities promises to be easy to calculate, and each is harder
than the previous one. But without calculating at least one, the theory makes no
predictions whatsoever. For present purposes we will call P (αi) a priori probabilities
which are calculated using one of Nvacua, Nreal, NV or NB. For example, we may use NB
to calculate PB(α), the probability per unit α that a randomly chosen baryon would
inhabit a universe in which α takes the given value. (For instance, suppose that only one
observable α varies among the universes, that each universe has a finite baryon number
B depending only on α, and that each universe has a value of α drawn at random from
some cumulative probability distribution p(α); then PB(α) ∝ B(α)dp(α)/dα would be
the probability per unit α that a randomly chosen baryon would inhabit a universe in
which α takes the given value.)
With P (αi) in hand, we wish to connect our observation of the αi to T ; but how?
The first approach one might consider, which may be termed the “bottom-up” approach‡,
is to use P (αi) as directly as possible and assert, for example, that for each k we should
observe αk to be near the peak of the probability distribution obtained by marginalizing
P (αi) over i 6= k. If not, then T is ruled out at some confidence level depending upon
the shape of P (αi) and the observed value of αk. This seems straightforward, but
† For this reason we will not consider here truly disjoint multiverses with no unifying physics T ;
see [17, 18] for a discussion of such multiverses and the rather daunting difficulties associated with
them.
‡ The idea of this nomenclature is that T , being fundamental, provides the foundation for a logical
structure – of which the succession of quantities Nvacua, Nreal, NV , and NB would be part – with our
particular low-energy, local observations at the top.
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hides an unavoidable choice that was made between weighting by baryons (using PB)
rather by volume (using PV ), or giving each universe equal weight (i.e., using Pvacua or
Preal). Implicitly we are asking: “What sort of universe should I live in, given that I
am a randomly chosen baryon?”, rather than “What should I observe given that I am
a random chosen volume element?” or “Given that I am a randomly chosen universe,
what type of universe should I be?” It is rather unclear which, if any, of these questions
bears upon an observation that we make. Indeed, the only completely unambiguous
situation would seem to be that in which α is completely independent of any other
physical property and so is simply a random variable that attains, in each universe, a
value drawn from the distribution P (α). But none of the cosmological parameters are
of this nature.
A second, quite different approach – which may be called “top-down” – asks the
question differently: “given everything thus far measured, along with T , what should I
measure for αk?” In making a prediction, one thus conditions on all available data
(including αi for i 6= k), implicitly discarding from consideration all regions with
properties different than those observed in our region. The danger of this approach
is that it leads to the acceptance of proposals for T for which the properties of our
observed universe are incredibly rare. Outside of cosmology, this may not be worrisome:
in order to test a theory we may construct a very special experimental arrangement and
not worry that is “improbable”. But in cosmology there is no wider context, and the
acceptance would go directly against normal scientific methodology: if a theory predicts
value a1 for some observable A with 99.99999% probability, and result a2 with 0.00001%,
one would be reluctant to accept the theory if a single trial were performed and result
a2 were obtained; why should this change if A has been measured previously and one is
now measuring observable B? For the top-down approach to make sense, it seems, one
must implicitly posit that there is some reason to neglect the discarded regions, so that
the conditionalization is justified.
The third approach, the “anthropic”, attempts to remedy the shortcomings of
the others by supplying the appropriate weighting quantity lacked by the bottom-up
approach, and at the same time providing the reason required by the top-down approach
for discarding regions unlike our own. The anthropic approach innocuously enough
attempts to derive the probability distribution of observed parameter values, and thus
implicitly asks: “given that I am a typical observer, what value of α should I expect to
measure?” (The key assumption, that we should expect to observe the same value as a
typical observer, been called the “principle of mediocrity” [33].) The anthropic approach
is, therefore, the bottom-up approach weighted by “observers”, and at the same time
an attempt to justify the top-down approach by asserting that regions very different
from our own have few or no observers in them. The clear problem of principle§ in the
anthropic approach is in how to define “observer.” One might ask, for example, “given
that I am a living being, what value of the cosmological constant Λ should I observe”
§ See [32, 18] for some discussion of the great technical problems.
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and obtain indeed a prediction for P (Λ) but the concomitant prediction that one is most
likely an insect or bacterium. Or it might be asked “given that I am in a galaxy, what
is P (Λ)?” But the results would then depend on the galaxy mass chosen, and may be
wrong if galaxies are either not required, or not all that is required, for the existence of
observers.
The bottom-up and top-down approaches form the ends of a spectrum of
conditionalization, with the anthropic approach (or any other approach that conditions
on some but not all available observations) in between.‖
The bottom-up approach has the maximal power to rule out proposals for T , but
may rule out the correct one. The top-down approach is sure to allow the correct theory,
but may additionally allow many other erroneous ones. The desirable compromise
(which seems to be the implicit hope of proponents of the anthropic principle) would
appear to be to condition on as little as possible, while still making entirely accurate
predictions of all data not conditioned on. But it is unclear how we can know
when minimal necessary conditionalization has been reached. This is the heart of the
conundrum.
One might hope that the distinctions between top-down, bottom-up, etc. would be
academic when it comes to making real predictions about the real universe. There is,
however, no reason to believe that this is the case. Clearly different conditionalizations
will lead to different probabalistic predictions from the same candidate T . But just
as clearly, this will lead to different inferences of the types of T s capable of matching
observations – a T that would reproduce our observations only by astonishing luck or
coincidence (and hence which we would be apt to discard) under one conditionalization
might seem very natural under another. Thus what may “naturally” be observed in
future observations may differ, in a rather general way, upon which type of reasoning
(i.e., what conditionalization level) is used.
In the next section, we more explicitly argue that this is the case, using an extended
and explicit example of predictions for dark matter.
3. Application to dark matter
3.1. The context
Consider, as discussed above, a proposal for T that predicts an ensemble of “universes”,
each of which may be accurately modeled as a big-bang described by N cosmological
parameters with values αk(k = 1..N). Now suppose, contrary to convention, that there
are NDM > 1 different independent substances that act as collisionless, nonbaryonic
dark matter, all of which exist in the low-energy phenomenology of T . Many such
particles exist in the literature, e.g. neutralinos and other supersymmetric particles,
axions, sterile neutrinos, Kaluza-Klein particles, cryptons, light scalar particles, “little
‖ We note that Hartle [24] has outlined the problem in quantum cosmology in somewhat similar terms,
and Bostrum’s notion of a “reference class” [25] is also similar.
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Higgs” particles, Q-balls, monopoles, WIMPzillas, LIMPs, CHAMPS, D-matter, Brane-
world dark matter, mirror matter, quark nuggets, primordial black holes, etc., etc. Not
all dark matter candidates in the literature can even in principle coexist – for example
there can be only one lightest supersymmetric particle in each universe. But let us
assume that the phenomenology of T is rich enough that some number NDM of them
are present in our full ensemble, with the density of each species i in each universe
characterized by a dark-matter-to-baryon ratio ηi ≡ ΩDM,i/Ωb, which may be zero.
Examples of ways in which densities for a number of dark matter candidates may become
probabalistic are given in [26].
For tractability, let us assume that each is governed by an independent normalizeable
cumulative probability distribution pi(ηi) that describes the probability that a randomly
chosen baryon resides in a universe with the given ηi. Of course in reality the
probabilities may well not be independent, nor independent of the αk; but the present
purpose is to explore differences in predictions for a given pi[ηi], and independent
probabilities are the simplest case. For convenience we will generally work with the
differential distribution in log ηi, Pi ≡ dp(ηi)/d ln ηi = ηidp(ηi)/dηi. Let the remaining
N − NDM parameters αk be described by a similarly defined probability distribution
p(α1, ...αN−NDM). These probability distributions may also describe parameters taking
discrete values by composing pi(ηi) and p(α1, ...αN−NDM) of δ-functions, but we will
assume that the distributions are smooth, or that the allowed discrete values of ηi are
closely enough spaced to be described by a smooth distribution.
3.2. Argument using bottom-up/minimal conditionalization
Let us now ask, using the bottom-up approach, what we expect to find in future
experiments bearing upon the nature of the dark matter. First, we must suppose that
our T proposal predicts that the probability distribution P (α1, ...αN−NDM) for already
measured parameters αk is such that those values are reasonably probable, or even
uniquely and correctly predicted – otherwise we should already have discarded T . (We
are thus assuming, here and in subsequent bottom-up reasoning, that the parameters
we observe are not highly unlikely given T .)
Now, each ηi might in principle take any order of magnitude; for definiteness, let
us say that each log ηi has a range of M ≫ 1.¶ It would then require fine-tuning for
any given universe two dark matter components would have η of the same order. This
is because each component will have a Pi that is either large only across a narrow range
of log η (in which case it is unlikely for that range to overlap with the η of the second
component), or will have a Pi that is large over a very wide range of log η (in which
case it is unlikely that in the given universe the η chosen from this wide distribution
will agree with the second component). Very roughly, we might estimate the degree of
fine-tuning by assuming that the Pi peak at uniformly random values of log η, and thus
¶ Of course, a specific T will only allow a specific range for each log ηi, but this is taken into account
by the Pi which would be nonzero only over this range.
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that the probability P of the j highest-density components having the same order of
magnitude would just be given by the binomial distribution:
P = p(j−1)(1− p)NDM−j
(NDM − 1)!
(NDM − j)!(j − 1)!
, (1)
where p = 1/M , and the average number j¯ of components coincident with the dominant
one will simply be j¯ = (NDM−1)/M . Both numbers will be very small unless NDM∼>M ,
i.e. NDM is extremely large.
By this argument, in the absence of any genuine information on the Pi, the only
likely occurence from the bottom-up approach is to have the dark matter dominated by
one species, with all other possibly existent species giving negligible contributions. If
the dominant species is predicted to have η ≈ ηobs ≃ 5 (the observed value) then the T
proposal may be accepted; otherwise it must be discarded and the argument repeated
with some new proposal for T .
The preceding elaborate argument has thus arrived at the standard conclusion that
given several dark matter types with independent physics (i.e., in the absence of any
physical reason why the Pi would peak narrowly near the same values), we would be
surprised if they all contributed similarly to ΩDM, for just the same reason it is generally
considered suprising that the energy densities of dark matter, baryons, neutrinos and
dark energy are all presently comparable.
Note that this is not, of course, a deductive prediction that could be obtained from
any given T . Rather, it is in inference drawn by comparing many imagined prospective
T -candidates to a set of observations. This is something we do routinely: for example, in
“deriving” cosmological parameters from astronomical observations we implicitly have
in mind an imaginary ensemble of universes which we can compare in turn with our
observations to select out the set that is in reasonable accord with those observations.
In doing that analysis, bottom-up reasoning weighted by universe is generally used,
which seems sensible given that the ensemble is imaginary; but the weighting could
be done differently (i.e., different “priors” could be chosen, or alternatively a different
measure could be placed over the space of theories) and different inferences would be
so obtained. In general we know of no reasonable way to define such a measure over
“theory space” and we made a simple assumption in calculating Eq. 1; however we note
that this is also implicitly done in any discussion of whether a given theory is fine-tuned.
The present argument is of just this character.
3.3. Argument using top-down/maximal conditionalization
Let us now perform the analysis from the top-down point of view. We again assume that
there is an ensemble of regions with NDM species of dark matter of densities ηi present in
each. Now, however, we further assume that we inhabit one member of a sub-ensemble
of universes in which the αi all take values compatible with current observations; in
particular we assume that whatever values the individual ηi take, the total dark matter
density η ≡
∑
i ηi satisfies η = ηobs, since this is essentially all that is known about the
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dark matter.+ This sub-ensemble may constitute a tiny part of the full ensemble, but
in the top-down approach we refuse to be troubled by this.
While we know η, we do not know the individual ηi, so we can predict their most
probable values using our candidate T . This requires that we maximize the total
probability
Ptot ∝
∏
i
Pi(log ηi), (2)
subject to η = ηobs. Each Pi may favor (i.e. have substantial probability at) “low” values
ηi ≪ ηobs, “high values” ηi ≫ ηobs, the observed value ηi ∼ ηobs, or some combination of
these. Now pick some component i. We have argued above that it is a priori unlikely
that only ηi ∼ ηobs will be likely. Then, if low values are favored (and whether or not
high or observed values are), then they are probably attained, since there is no conflict
with the conditionalization η ≃ ηobs; therefore each such component would be expected
to have an unobservably small density in our universe.
This leaves us with Nbig components with probable values near or far above ηobs.
Let us then examine the set of Pi for these near ηi ∼ ηobs, where they may have small
(but nonzero∗) probability.
We can compute the maximum of the total probability Ptot subject to the condition
of fixed η = ηobs using a Lagrange multiplier:
max
{
lnPtot − λ
∑
i
ηi
}
gives
max
∑
i
[lnPi − ληi]
and the solution
d lnPi/dηi = λ. (3)
In other words, the optimal values ηi have the intuitive property that increasing any of
them by a small amount increases lnPtot by the same factor λ.
For a more explicit solution we will assume that each is locally a power-law, i.e.
Pi ∝ η
βi
i . (4)
Since we are considering a narrow range of η ∼ ηobs, this should be a good approximation
unless there is a preferred scale in the probability distribution of order ηobs, which is a
priori unlikely (i.e. would require fine-tuning). We also assume βi > 0 as we are only
considering the Nbig components with probabilities peaked at high η.
+ Implicitly, we are assuming that all of the components genuinely are cold, weakly interacting, particles
that could not have been detected by current experiments. Stronger constraints could be imposed on,
e.g., warm or hot dark matter.
∗ If for any of the components favoring high ηi, no universes have log ηi < log ηobs, then of course T is
ruled out; this would be wonderful as it would be a definite prediction of T .
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The maximization of Ptot subject to η = ηobs yields, using Eq. 3,
ηi =
(
βi
β
)
ηobs, β ≡
∑
j
βj, (5)
thus the contributions to η of the Nbig components will be different by orders of
magnitude only if the power-laws governing the probability distributions at ηi ∼ η
obs
are. This cannot be ruled out (although this may be possible in the anthropic approach
as discussed below), but it may be argued for some specific cases that this is unlikely;
for example, in discussing the cosmological constant in a similar context, Weinberg [28]
(see also [27, 10, 29, 26]) argues that because the range considered (here η ∼ ηobs) is so
small compared to the characteristic scale governing P (ηi), the latter should locally be
nearly flat (i.e., β = 1 here).
Three conclusions have been drawn using the top-down approach, summarized as
follows. First, it is very likely that we live in a very improbable ensemble member,
because at least one dark matter component i is likely to have Pi peaked at ηi ≫ ηobs.
But we have decreed that we shall accept this in light of observed facts. Second, as in
the bottom-up case, a number of components should contribute η ≪ ηobs, and we shall
probably not detect these. Third, several components should contribute roughly equally
to ηobs, unless one of the components has a probability distribution that is both peaked
at η ≫ ηobs and is quickly varying at η ∼ ηobs. We shall call this the “principle of
equal representation” (PER): when a conditionalization is placed on a sum α ≡
∑
i αi of
parameters with (relatively slowly) rising independent probability distributions P(αi),
the most probable combination subject to the conditionalization is that all αi are of
similar order.
Thus the generic prediction of the top-down case is directly contrary to the result
obtained in the bottom-up case; whereas in the latter we would expect one dominant
dark matter form, here it is quite reasonable to expect several (even many) forms to
have comparable contributions. However, we cannot eliminate the possibility of an
extremely high βi value that would allow one component to be dominant, nor nor have
we explained why we live in a very improbable region.
3.4. Anthropic argument/partial conditionalization
The final approach we may take is that of partial conditionalization, which includes the
anthropic approach. Starting with the same ensemble of universes each with NDM dark
matter components, we calculate probabilities as in the bottom-up approach, but with
an additional weighting (or “conditionalization) factor W (αk) applied to the baryon-
weighted (or volume-weighted) probabilities. To reproduce the top-down approach, for
example, we may set W (αk) = 0 if αk is incompatible with our observations for any k,
and W = 1 otherwise. Then if the probabilities are re-normalized, this is equivalent
to limiting the analysis to a sub-ensemble of universes compatible with our current
observations. But W can be much less restrictive. For example, W (αk) could count
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the number of some object X (say a large spiral galaxy) per baryon in a universe with
parameters αk.
The (re-normalized) W -weighted probabilities can be interpreted in two different
ways. First, they could be said to describe what we expect to measure for αk given only
that we observe an X . One might then view this “partial conditionalization” approach
simply as relaxing the top-down assumptions, in order to gain more predictive power
using less assumptions [30, 14, 23]; but why keep some conditions, and not all, or none?
Alternatively, one might with a slight philosophical shift take the anthropic
approach of attempting to ask: “given that I am a randomly chosen observer, what
should I observe?” Then the X -object should be an observer, and the W -weighted
probabilities would describe the probability that a randomly chosen observer inhabits
a universe with parameters αk. This clears up some of the ambiguity of the partial
conditionalization approach in that there is a justification conditionalizing on observers.
However, since there is no obvious definition of what “observer” actually means, one is
forced to adopt some proxy – stars, galaxies, or universes “pretty much” like ours – and
hence the ambiguity remains.
A third possibility, often employed in the literature in making anthropic predictions,
is to focus on a single parameter, say Λ, fix all other cosmological parameters to the
observed values, then weight P(Λ) by some some proxy for observers, e.g. by a W (Λ)
that is the number of galaxies per baryon (or unit volume) in a universe of the given Λ.
This approach is generally taken for purposes of tractability, but is really justified only if
Λ alone varies across the ensemble; the predictions made by varying only one parameter
will generally not be the same as if several are varied (see Sec. 5 and Refs. [31, 32, 34, 35]),
and if several parameters vary, it seems hard to justify treating only a subset of them
anthropically.
In any case, once a conditionalization (or weighting) factor is chosen, a calculation
can be done to predict the various dark matter densities by computing the total
probability that an X resides in a universe with defining parameters αk and dark matter
ratios ηi:
Ptot = P(αk)×
∏
i
Pi ×W (αk, η), (6)
where W is the number of X s per baryon in a universe with parameters αk and total
dark matter density η.♯
Now there are three possibilities. Either 1) Ptot allows reasonable probability of
the observed values of αk and η, and W (η) is falling near η ∼ ηobs, or 2) the same, but
W (η) is rising at η ∼ ηobs, or 3) Ptot has little probability near the observed values.
In cases 1) and 2), we have a good candidate for an anthropic explanation of
the cosmological parameters αk and η if we can make a strong argument that our X -
object is a good proxy for an observer. But what do we predict for the individual
dark matter densities ηi? In case 1, the situation is quite similar to that in the top-
down approach, and the same arguments lead to the conclusion that it is natural for
♯ We are assuming here that only the total dark matter density is important in forming X -objects.
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several dark components of comparable density to contribute to η, with several other
components existing at undetectable levels. Thus the PER applies to the anthropic
standpoint, if there is a high-η cutoff in the hospitality factor W (η). In case 2, however,
the PER will not hold, because P(ηi) must be falling for all i (or else Ptot could not fall
off on both sides of ηobs, and we would instead be discussing case 3). In this case Ptot
will be greatest when only one dark matter component is required to take an improbable
value ηi ∼ ηobs.
Similarly, additional inferences can in principle be made using using case 3 that Ptot
does not peak near the observed parameter values. In this case we are led to conclude
that the fundamental theory and its P are incorrect. Given a form of W , we can in
this way constrain the form of P. To see this more explicitly, suppose that we have a
candidate T with NDM dark matter components for which Pi ∝ η
βi
i at η ∼ ηobs, and for
which all other parameters have fixed, unique values. Then let us maximize
Ptot(ηi) ∝
∏
i
ηβii W (η). (7)
Because the conditionalization factor W depends only on the total dark matter density
η, the maximum of Ptot will occur where each ηi = βi/β (where β ≡
∑
i βi), as in the
top-down approach. But furthermore, the peak will occur at a value ηmax that depends
upon β.
For example, let us modelW (for demonstrational purposes only) by either a power-
law falloff (with index γ) or Gaussian decline for η > η0, i.e.
W (η) ∝
1
1 + (η/η0)γ
or W (η) ∝ e−η
2/2η2
0 . (8)
If P(ηi) ∝ η
βi
i , then it is readily shown that
P(η) ∝ ηβ, (9)
and the maximum of Ptot occurs at
ηmax = η0
(
β
γ − β
)
−1/γ
or ηmax = β
1/2η0, (10)
respectively.
Knowledge of η0 and γ would then allow us to limit the maximum allowed βi for our
candidate T . If W has a power law cutoff, we must have γ > β, or else the probability
would be dominated by η ≫ η0 and we would discard the T leading to that β. The
Gaussian falloff in the conditionalization factor will defeat any power law indices βi, but
if β ≫ 0, then probability would be peaked at η ≫ ηobs unless η0 ≪ ηobs. For example,
if β =2, 4 or 8, then 95% of the probability in P(β)W (β) lies at η > η0×0.31, 1.04
and 1.8, respectively. Thus for our observations to be compatible with β = 8 at 95%
confidence, we would have to (uncomfortably) assert that η0 < ηobs/1.8, i.e. that we
are well into the exponentially cutoff in W , and, for example, that a universe with only
slightly more dark matter would have far fewer observers.
An upper limit on allowed β can be used in two ways. First, we can derive an
upper limit to the number components that should, by the previous arguments, have
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comparable ηi, since these components must all have βi ≥ 1.†† No such limit exists in
the top-down approach. Second, a limit on β can rule out one component i having a βi
orders of magnitude greater than all the rest, strengthening (as compared to the top-
down approach) the argument that components with rising W should be comparable in
density – though as noted above the anthropic argument for multiple components holds
only if W (η) is decreasing near ηobs.
4. Equal representation in other cosmological quantities
The arguments given concerning dark matter that lead to the Principle of Equal
Representation (PER) could also be applied to other cosmological parameters such as
the neutrino density parameter Ων , the amplitude Q of density inhomogeneities, and
the cosmological constant Λ. In all cases we could place a constraint on the total value
(either from observation or from anthropic considerations), so we might apply the PER
to a situation in which there were multiple possible contributions to Ων , Q, or Λ. The
argument is, however, somewhat different for each parameter.
In the case of Q, inflation tends to quash rival pre-inflationary perturbation sources;
thus a second significant component would have to be imprinted later, and would likely
be either non-Gaussian, non-adiabatic, or non-scale-invariant (as we presently know no
post-inflation perturbation source without at least one of these properties). The present
data suggests none of these.
As for Λ, the argument is complicated by the fact that Λ can be either positive or
negative, so that contributions of large magnitude may cancel. Also, to be meaningfully
distinguishable the contributors must be dynamically different, so the arguments would
have to be applied to multiple parameters describing the details of the dark energy
components.
Massive neutrinos provide an interesting context in which to make detailed
calculations because it is known that there are three neutrino species with nonzero mass,
and because the cosmological effects of massive neutrinos are relatively well-understood.
Neutrinos with masses in the eV range slow the growth of density perturbations
on small-scales, thereby suppressing galaxy formation. This effect as been used [36, 34]
to derive an anthropic prediction of Ων (or equivalently the sum mν =
∑
imi of the
neutrino masses mi) under the assumptions that 1) either only mν , or only mν and Λ
vary across the ensemble, 2) the number of observers is proportional to the collapse
fraction of dark matter into bound halos, and 3) the prior distribution of either mν or
of the individual neutrino species’ masses are flat:
P(mν) ∝ mν or P(mi) ∝ mi.
The suppression of galaxies provides a near-exponential cutoff in W (mν) that when
combined with P(mν) gives 95% of the probability in the range 0.13–5 eV. (When
††Of course, if 0 ≤ βi ≤ 1, there could be more components; but if the power law extends to η ≪ ηobs
then the probability lies mostly there, so there is no reason to expect η ∼ ηobs.
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variation in Λ is included and marginalized over, this shifts to 0.035–5 eV.)
What would we expect for the neutrino masses using our different methods of
reasoning? The two measured neutrino mass splittings are δm223 = 2.5 × 10
−3 eV2 and
δm212 = 8 × 10
−5 eV2 [37, 38], and cosmological observations bound mν∼<0.42 eV [39].
From the bottom-up approach, we would require a T with high probability to have
all three masses mi∼<0.13 eV, and with one family of mass > 0.007 eV and another of
mass > 0.05 eV. This would be surprising if the families had independent physics (as in
the posited dark matter species discussed above) but of course they probably do not,
and we would simply expect a successful T to predict an overall neutrino mass scale
∼ 0.01− 0.05 eV, with splittings of the same order.
In the top-down approach, the predictions would be similar, except that it would
be possible for the overall neutrino mass scale to be highly improbable.
The anthropic approach is potentially more interesting. Under the assumption that
all three neutrino species were governed by independent P(mi) ∝ mi, the anthropic
prediction (as derived by [36] under the above assumptions) would be mν ∼ 3 eV.
The probability distribution for the either of the two mass splittings can be similarly
computed, and is centered about zero with a width of ∼ 1 eV, so we would expect all
three neutrino masses to be∼eV in a nice exhibit of the PER. (For the same P(mi) ∝ mi,
bottom-up reasoning would predict very large mν and large mass splittings.) However,
As mν ∼ 3 eV violates the cosmological bound and ∼ 1 eV splittings far exceed the
observed ones, we must rule out any T with P(mi) ∝ mi. Instead, we must assume
P(mν) ∝ mν , in which case the predictions of [34] are compatible at 95% confidence
with the observed bounds. In this case the mass splittings would presumably follow
from the neutrino physics, rather than the PER.
5. Variations in multiple parameters, and cosmic coincidences
One of the surprising aspects of the standard cosmological model is that so many
energetic constituents of the present-day universe have such similar densities, i.e.
ΩΛ/ΩDM ≈ 2, ΩDM/Ωb ≈ 5, and Ωb/Ων∼<30, even though many or all of these densities
are thought to arise from essentially independent physics.
Anthropic (or other partial-conditionalization) reasoning affords an opportunity to
explain these “coincidences” because even if P(αi) factorizes into P(α1)...P(αN ), the
conditionalization factorW (αi) almost certainly will not, and therefore the product PW
used in making predictions from the theory T will have correlations between the αi. Part
of the purpose of the present paper is to point out that if the true explanation of the
coincidences in these parameters is that their values are bound together by the necessity
of observers, (which provide a particularW ) then we may expect new, as-yet-unobserved
coincidences. These might consist of similar contributions to currently unresolvable
components such as dark matter, or, in principle, of new coincidental aspects of the
universe. The “preposterous” universe [40] may get even worse.
But the possibility of explaining cosmic coincidences comes at a price: degeneracies
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in W imply that the anthropic prediction for one parameter will likely change when
additional parameters are allowed to vary; and there is every reason to believe that
degeneracies exist in W [32, 31, 35]. Thus an anthropic explanation of the observed
αi(i = 1..N) really requires the computation of both P and W over the N -dimensional
parameter space; and until all N are considered, there is no reason to hope that
adding an additional parameter will not spoil the correct prediction. In the context
of the spectrum of conditionalization, one is working from the top-down toward a fully
anthropic approach; and as the conditionalization factor is loosened, more and more
theories can be ruled out; each “successful” anthropic prediction is only provisional.
6. Summary & Conclusions
While our observable universe is well-desribed by a simple big-bang FRW cosmological
model, attempts to understand that model at a more fundamental level through
inflation, quantum cosmology, and string/M theory have raised the spectre of multiple
quasi-FRW regions (“universes”) with different properties. We must then ask: given a
fundamental theory of physics and cosmology T , how can we extract from it predictions
for the single universe we can observe? It has been variously asserted that in a
future measurement, we should observe the most probable set of predicted properties
(the “bottom-up” approach), or the most probable set compatible with all current
observations (the “top-down” approach), or the most probable set consistent with
the existence of observers (the “anthropic” approach). These correspond to three
different implicit questions of the form: “Given that X, what should I observe in future
measurement Y”, with X being a conditionalization that is minimal in the bottom-
up approach, and maximal in the top-down approach. Given a theory that predicts a
multiverse, these questions will have different answers, and hence different implications
what we will observe in a future measurement. This paper has been a rough exploration
of these different questions and their differing implications.
There are both problems of principle and great technical challenges in
mathematically describing the ensemble of universes and defining a measure so that an
a priori probability distribution P(αk) can be defined for the parameters αk describing
low-energy physics and cosmology. Does each possible universe, or each realized
universe, or each volume element, or each baryon receive equal weight? Making this
choice contitutes a definition of the bottom-up probabilities, and the ambiguity in this
choice may be termed the “measure problem” [41].
To investigate the top-down and anthropic approaches, we have optimistically
assumed that these a priori probabilities can in principle be defined and computed,
and have made simple assumptions about the form of P(αk) in order to draw some
exemplary and qualitative conclusions, focusing on the particular issue of dark matter,
in the context of an imagined ensemble in which there are NDM physically independent
species of dark matter, with different densities ηi (i = 1..NDM) in each ensemble member.
Among these conclusions are:
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• Using bottom-up reasoning, we would generically expect to see one dominant form
of dark matter, because it would be unlikely for any of the other independent dark
components to have a comparable density by chance.
• Using top-down reasoning, we can fix the total dark matter density η ≡
∑
i ηi but
not the individual contributions. But these can be predicted by assuming that we
live in a rather typical universe consistent with the observed η. If P(ηi) varies
smoothly near ηi ∼ η for each i, the overall probability will be maximized for all
ηi ∼ η/NDM. The prediction of many dark matter components of similar density is
directly contrary to the bottom-up prediction, and is a demonstration of what we
call the Principle of Equal Representation.
• Using anthropic reasoning, we will obtain the same predictions for the dark matter
components as in top-down reasoning, if the conditionalization factor (which
essentially constitutes a choice of definition of “observer”) forces the prediction
for η, as well as the other cosmological parameters, to accord with the observed
values (and in particular provides a cutoff at η∼>ηobs). Moreover, for some types
of “observers”, the conditionalization factor W (αk) can be actually estimated, and
used to contrain P(αk) by eliminating theories for which P (αk)W (αk) does not peak
near the observed values of αk. This strengthens the argument for the coincidence
between components, but suggests that the number of coincident dark components
cannot be large.
None of the three methods (or those elsewhere on the spectrum) is obviously
“correct”, and each has serious issues. The bottom-up approach suffers from an
ambiguity in the measure, and may rule out the correct T . The top-down approach may
allow an incorrect theory, by simply asserting that we inhabit an exceedingly unlikely
member of the ensemble, while providing no reason why this is the case. And the
anthropic method, while providing a measure and a reason for excluding many ensemble
members, requires the definition of an observer – which is itself quite ambiguous.
Perhaps, we may hope that nature may give us a clue as to which sort of reasoning
we should employ, for a key point of this paper is that if the anthropic effects are the
explanation of the parameter values – and coincidences between them – that we see, then
it ought to predict that new coincidences will be observed in future observations. If in the
next several decades dark matter is resolved into several equally important components,
dark energy is found to be, say, five independent substances, and several other “cosmic
coincidences” are observed, even the most die-hard skeptic might accede that the
anthropic approach may have some validity. On the other hand, if we are essentially
finished in defining the basic cosmological constituents, then anthropic reasoning might
be able to explain some of these, but (beyond its arguably successful prediction of a small
but nonzero cosmological constant) would have missed its chance predict anything not
yet observed.
Probably the best we can hope to do is, starting with a T , work our way down the
conditionalization spectrum, knowing that any successful predictions are provisional as
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the theory could be ruled out each successive stage of weaker conditionalization. But we
must keep in mind that if there is a correct T , using it to make successful predictions may
really require some conditionalization, and we will never be able to be completely sure
that there is not a different T that could require less. When dealing with multiverses,
the dream of a final theory may be just that.
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